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Abstract  
Museum educators play a key role in explaining science in a museum. Verbal language is 
primarily used to communicate scientific concepts, but the way language shapes the explanations 
provided has not been investigated. This qualitative study focuses on the explanations about light 
provided by three museum educators to 8th grade students (13-14 years old), during unstructured 
visits to a science museum. The visits were audio-recorded and field notes taken. The museum 
educators’ language was analyzed at a micro-level, through the perspective of Cognitive 
Linguistics and Conceptual Metaphor theory. The results of this analysis coupled with a 
multidimensional framework for analysing explanations allowed an understanding on what is 
explained and how it is explained in the museum by museum educators. Findings show that 
explanations were descriptive and causal, structured by the use of hybrid lexicon and by 
conceptual metaphors, whose quality depends on the structural similarity between domains. 
Furthermore, the explanations based on geometric optics were qualitative and with low level of 
precision, complexity and abstractness. 
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Science museums not only preserve and study objects of scientific interest, but also contribute to 
science education (Stocklmayer, Rennie, & Gilbert, 2010). By embracing science education, 
science museums support an appreciation of the meanings of currently agreed explanations and to 
the ways in which they were arrived at (Yeo, & Gilbert, 2014). Teachers value the contribution of 
museums to enhance students’ learning of scientific ideas that are part of the curriculum or that 
complement it in ways that are not possible in schools (Kisiel, 2005). While learning scientific 
content is one of the main reasons for taking students on school visits to museums, teachers often 
do not support learning in these institutions (Faria, & Chagas, 2013). They often rely on front-
line museum educators (museum educators, henceforth) for facilitating students’ meaning 
making. This entails discussing new ideas which, in turn, requires some explaining (Baram-
Tsabari, & Lewenstein, 2017). Because these professionals act between unseen or hidden science 
of the curatorial department and the visitors (Anderson, Cosson, & McIntoshosh, 2015), what is 
explained is, to some extent, restricted by the institutions’ missions and rules (Clark, 1996). The 
content and style of those explanations vary widely, as museum educators need to embrace the 
diversity of visitors (Vlach, & Noll, 2016), who differ not only in terms of how they understand 
the message, but also in terms of what they consider worth knowing (Callanan, & Jipson, 2001). 
Indeed, even for children in school groups, learning in museums is inevitably driven by their 
choice, that may or may not be aligned with the teachers’ or with the museums’ learning agendas 
(Falk, & Dierking, 2000; Mujtaba, Lawrence, Oliver, & Reiss, 2018). This learning context puts 
pressure on museum educators as they need to understand the audience well to explain science in 
a way that is relevant, interesting, and engaging for the learner (Rennie, 2013).  
Explaining science in the museum is, therefore, neither straightforward nor intuitive. 
Research on parent-child explanations in science museums reveals that overall parents’ 
explanations are often brief, fragmented, do not fully explain the scientific idea, and focus on a 
particular event, rather than on big ideas (Crowley, & Galco, 2001).  Explanations were 
sometimes presented through ad hoc analogies, with low level of structural similarity between 
analogue and target (Crowley, Callanan, Tenenbaum, & Allen, 2001; Valle, & Callanan, 2006), 
but the created comparisons often attended to children’s interests and background knowledge 
(Valle, & Callanan, 2006). Despite parents’ limitations in explaining new situations, conceptual 
gains for children, who engaged deeply with the situations presented to them, were observed 
(Crowley, Callanan, & Tenenbaum, et al., 2001).  
Museum educators, in their role as science communicators (Stocklmayer, 2013), are asked 
to develop a body of knowledge and skills (see Tran, & King, 2007) that support learning at 
multiple dimensions (see the six learning strands approach by Bell, Lewenstein, Shouse, & Feder 
(2009)), being conceptual learning an important component of the museum visit. Hence, museum 
educators would be expected to engage in successful explanatory practices with an intended 
audience. However, little is known about museum educators’ actual explanatory practices, in part 
because their professional development has attracted little attention (Patrick, 2017).  
Some of the known studies show that museum educators, during guided school visits, 
often deliver fact-based information, using undigested scientific jargon and disregarding students’ 
background knowledge (Cox-Peterson, Marsh, Kiesel, & Melber, 2003; Tal, & Morag, 2007). In 
contrast, Tran (2007) found that museum educators adjusted the depth and details of content 
discussed to students’ interests and needs and employed a diversity of strategies to enhance 
learning. In line with Tran (2007), Pattison and Dierking, (2012, 2013), in a study with families 
in science museums during non-guided visits, revealed that museum educators discussed the 
science behind the exhibits by connecting it with the audience’s prior knowledge and experience 
with the phenomena.  
What these studies do not provide, however, are insights on how and to what extent the 
language used by museum educators (i.e. verbal and discourse strategies) shapes the explanations 
provided and may contribute to enhancing science learning. In all known studies in science 
museums, data were collected by observing and/or interviewing museum educators about their 
practice rather than recording their interaction with the audience and analyzing the language used 
to explain scientific phenomena. Recording and analyzing museum educators’ speech during 
interaction with museum visitors is of paramount importance, because spontaneous speech is an 
ephemeral phenomenon. Unless it is recorded as it is being produced, museum educators will not 
be able, upon reflection, to reproduce it exactly in the same way. 
As verbal language is the main and often only tool used by museum educators (King, & 
Tran, 2017), a linguistic analysis of the explanations provided, particularly from the perspective 
of Cognitive Linguistics and Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff, & Johnson, 1980 and 
followers) used in the present study, can provide an insight into how particular scientific concepts 
are mentally structured (and transmitted) by museum educators. This analysis, in turn, will enable 
the identification of the perspective of the “official science” that museum educators offer to a 
given audience (i.e. the explanations selected) and an assessment of the quality of the 
explanations, which could inform their future practice in view of enhancing learning. 
Language, from the perspective of Cognitive Linguistics and Conceptual Metaphor 
theory, is an embodied cognitive ability, i.e. it arises from and is a reflection of the basic bodily 
experience of the external world (Lakoff, & Johnson, 1980). It furthermore construes our 
experience. Language is therefore a window to our conceptual system made up of concrete and 
abstract concepts, which emerge through conceptual metaphor, i.e. mappings between a concrete 
source domain to an abstract target domain. Research has shown (e.g. Gibbs, 1994) that 
metaphors have a psychological reality, and, as such, metaphors play a role in, among other 
processes, organizing human thought (Kovecses, 2009). 
 Through the analysis of museum educators’ language, in particular the use of metaphors, 
this study aims at analyzing the explanations about light provided by museum educators during 
school visits. The empirical analysis of the museum educators’ language will address the 
following questions: 
1.  What type of explanations on light did museum educators convey (i.e. function of 
explanation)? 
2. Which verbal resources, including conceptual metaphors, did the museum educators 
deploy in order to explain light phenomena (i.e. form of the explanation)?  
3. What are the museum educators’ conceptualization of light conveyed through language 
(including conceptual metaphors) and to what extent do these conceptualizations concur 
with the scientific ideas of light phenomena? 
4. What was the quality of the explanations provided (i.e. level of explanation)?  
Looking at explanations in science education through a multidimensional framework 
Scientific explanations are a major goal of science education (e.g. Bell et al., 2009; Treagust, & 
Harrison, 2000). Gilbert and collaborators (Gilbert, Boulter, & Rutherford, 2000; Gilbert, Taber, 
& Watts, 2001; Yeo, & Gilbert, 2014) developed over the years a framework to look at 
explanations in science education from different angles, i.e. function (i.e. the purpose of 
explanation); level (i.e. quality of explanation); and form (i.e. the structure of the discourse) 
(Yeo, & Gilbert, 2014). These components are important to consider when scientific explanations 
are communicated by museum educators, as will be discussed in turn. 
 
Function  
The lack of agreement on what a scientific explanation is (Harré, 1983) has resulted in the 
coexistence of different philosophical models of explanations, each performing different 
functions (e.g. the Covering law model, or the causal model) (Braaten, & Windschitl, 2011). 
These models need to be considered in science education (Braaten, & Windschitl, 2011) so that 
science can be as “authentic” as possible (Gilbert, Boulter, & Rutherford, 2000). However, a 
useful way of studying science is to imagine it as answering certain questions about phenomena 
(e.g. “What happened?”; or “How did it happen?”), perspectivized from different angles (Harré, 
1983). The responses to those questions are statements of knowledge (termed explanations) with 
specific purposes (Gilbert, Boulter, & Rutherford, 2000). The explanations can be of different 
types, according to the different functions explanations may perform (see Table 1). 
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Successful explanatory practices should be grounded on conscious decisions on the types of 
explanations which are relevant for a given audience. For example, for primary school students, 
causal explanations might not be relevant, but descriptive explanations seem appropriate.  
 
Level 
The level of a scientific explanation (i.e. its quality) can be assessed by considering to what 
extent it fulfils the purpose for which it was generated. It can be assessed in terms of precision, 
abstraction, and complexity (Yeo, & Gilbert, 2014). Precision is a property of model descriptors, 
whose function is to represent models on which explanations are based, e.g. equations, graphs, 
and axiomatic statements built on general abstract terms (e.g. “energy” or “light ray”) (Weisberg, 
2006). Precision is concerned with the fineness of specification of the model descriptors 
(Weisberg, 2006), i.e. in terms of the detail in representing aspects of a phenomenon. For 
example, the level of precision of a front-wave diagram is higher than the level of precision of a 
ray diagram, as the latter does not represent entities such as the speed of light. The precision of an 
explanation is influenced by the context in which the explanation is required (Treagust, & 
Harrison, 2000; Yeo, & Gilbert, 2014). In the domain of very short wavelengths compared with 
the dimensions of the equipment available for their study, for example, geometrical optics is 
appropriate to describe the phenomena, using model descriptors such as light ray and refractive 
index. In this situation, there is no need to use more precise model descriptors, as Maxwell 
equations, because the electromagnetic field behaves locally as a plane wave.  
Abstraction of a scientific explanation arises from its representation through model 
descriptors, which are far removed from reality (Weisberg, 2007). Model descriptors emphasize 
aspects of the world that are important to be considered in its representation, omit others, and add 
fabricated entities (Weisberg, 2007; Yeo, & Gilbert, 2014). Their meaning is set up according to 
the conventions defined by the scientific community, and often do not resemble the part of the 
world they represent (Weisberg, 2007). Nevertheless, there are relations of similarity between the 
scientific explanation and the world, or parts of it (Yeo, & Gilbert, 2014), allowing the latter to 
be conceptualized. In geometric optics, for example, ray light indicates the direction of the 
motion of light, but does not provide any information about its nature. 
Complexity of a scientific explanation refers to its completeness and coherence. The 
former includes an assessment of how well an explanation describes the structure and processes 
of a phenomenon (Matthewson, & Weisberg, 2009), and the reasons to support the claims made. 
The latter refers to the consistency of the explanations provided with the accepted scientific 
knowledge (Yeo, & Gilbert, 2014). In the museum, museum educators need to select the 
appropriate model descriptors to represent an explanation for a given situation. However, they 
also need to be aware that the audience is often unfamiliar with those model descriptors, because 
they are part of the scientific language. Hence, model descriptors need to be comprehensible to 
the audience without compromising the complexity of the explanation.  
 
Form 
The form refers to the features of language used to provide scientific explanations. Scientific texts 
are considered to be a genre with which specific linguistic characteristics are associated, not only 
at the micro-level, e.g. lexical innovations to create specialized terminology (Halliday, & Martin, 
1993), but also at the macro-level, i.e. the organization of the text itself1.  
Yeo and Gilbert (2014) propose a three-level analysis of the explanation narrative produced 
by a Grade 12 student: macro-level (organization of the narrative), meso-level (the speaker’s 
vantage viewpoint in producing the explanation) and micro-level (how abstract meaning is 
conveyed in each turn). The analysis of the narrative at the micro-level shows the importance of 
pictorial resources as everyday semiotic tools of meaning-making along with the expected use of 
scientific representation schemes (Yeo, & Gilbert, 2014). However, the use of verbal language to 
construct abstractness of explanation, and in particular the use of everyday language and metaphors 
along with scientific terminology, was not addressed.  
Language, regardless of the context of its use, construes human experience with the 
world. Just like the everyday use of language, the use of language in science also construes 
human experience. However, the conventionalized, and to some extent ritualized, way in which 
language is used in science has been recognized by scientists themselves as “creat[ing] a massive 
disjunction between everyday commonsense knowledge and the systematized knowledge of the 
disciplines” (Halliday, & Martin, 1993, p. 53).  
In instructional settings, both in formal and particularly in informal settings, such as in a 
science museum, the use of language can shed light on how scientific phenomena are 
conceptualized by museum educators. Museum educators interact with a variety of audiences 
whose social and intellectual expectations are projected on to the demand of an explanation. 
These expectations, which must be perceived by the museum educator, will have an impact on 
the way scientific concepts are verbally explained. For example, when explaining light to 
secondary students, museum educators need to decide on whether it is enough to use the 
geometric optics (Raftopoulos, Kalyfommatou, & Constantinou, 2015) or to extend the 
explanation so as to include the link between particle and wave model of light (Rutherford, 
2000). Providing scientific explanations in informal contexts does not always follow the same 
level of structured interaction as in formal education settings. However, the final goal in both 
contexts is the same: communication and acquisition of a scientific concept.  
Because the three dimensions (function, level and form) are correlated, Yeo and Gilbert’s 
(2014) framework allows us to assess how successful museum educators are in communicating 
scientific explanations. In this framework, particular attention needs to be given to the language 
used as a tool to “translate” scientific explanations in a way that the audience can understand. 
Many authors (e.g. Alexander, 2006; DeWitt, & Osborne, 2007; Mercer & Littleton, 2007) have 
pointed out that language is the most important tool for learning, as it is central to learners in 
knowledge (re)construction. Indeed, studies in formal and informal education have discussed the 
explanatory power of analogies (e.g. Dagher, 1995; Rennie, Stocklmayer, & Gilbert, 2019; Zhai, 
& Dillon, 2014). However, if one truly wishes to assess the success of a scientific explanation, 
and its communication, the analysis of the use of language cannot be limited to the production of 
analogies, but must necessarily encompass the vastness of language in its full range of resources. 
An explanation may be well structured but fails to be communicated effectively; on the other 
hand, it may be less well structured but the way in which it is communicated is effective. 
Cognitive Linguistics in general, and metaphor theory in particular, is a linguistic framework that 
argues convincingly for the association between language and mental structures so that, through 
language, it is possible to unveil how the world is conceptualized. The combination of the two 
theoretical frameworks is crucial and presents itself as a very robust way to assess the success of 
a scientific explanation, both in terms of its structure as well as in terms of how it is 
communicated. 
 
Metaphor as the underlying mechanism of human conceptual structure 
Historically, metaphors have been considered to be primarily “a kind of decorative addition to the 
ordinary plain language – a rhetorical device to be used at certain times to gain certain effects” 
(Saeed, 2016, p. 370). It was only in the early 20th century that metaphors were recognized to be 
omnipresent in everyday language. Richards (1936, p. 92) described metaphors as the 
“omnipresent principle of language” and, most importantly, concluded that metaphor is a 
structuring element of thought: “Thought is metaphorical (…) and the metaphors of language 
derive therefrom” (Richards, 1936, p. 94; emphasis in original).  
In the same light, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) (see also Sweetser, 1990 and Kövecses, 
2010) argued that human’s conceptual system is metaphorical, i.e. metaphors are the organizing 
principle of concepts which structure what and “how people think, reason and imagine in 
everyday life” (Gibbs, 1997, p. 145). Human’s conceptual system is therefore metaphorical in 
nature (Lakoff, & Johnson, 1980; Kövecses, 2010). One evidence for the metaphorical nature of 
thought is the ubiquity of metaphorical expressions in everyday language. Many of these are not 
used consciously by speakers; they have become conventionalized (conventional metaphors) due 
to its high frequency of use (e.g. “we construct a theory”, “attack an idea” (Lakoff, & Johnson, 
1980, p. 54)).  
The conceptual structure is organized according to cross-mappings between conceptual 
domains. These mappings are unidirectional and operate between a source and a target domain. 
Basic physical experiences, i.e. interaction between human sensorimotor system with the 
surrounding environment, underlie basic conceptual knowledge (substance, travel, etc.) and 
image schemas, which, in turn, structure abstract concepts metaphorically. An image schema, 
such as container, path, etc. is a “recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of (...) ongoing 
ordering activities [such as actions, perceptions, and conceptions]. These patterns emerge as 
meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our bodily movements through space, our 
manipulation of objects, and our perceptual interactions” (Lakoff, & Johnson, 1980, p. 29). For 
instance, ‘to be in love’ is a conventional metaphor which structures a state by means of a 
mapping between conceptual domains; the source or concrete domain incorporates the embodied 
or bodily-based knowledge of a container.  
There is cross-linguistic evidence that source domains are generally based on embodied 
experience (e.g. human body, animals, plants, food, forces) whereas target domains are more 
abstract in nature (e.g. emotion, morality, thought, human relationships, time).  
Metaphors, therefore, play an important role in understanding because they are capable of 
attributing new meanings to abstract experiences which can only be fully comprehended through 
familiar entities and experiences (e.g. AN ARGUMENT IS A BUILDING) (Lakoff, & Johnson, 
1980), i.e. “the embodied conceptions in the source domain provide an inference pattern to reason 
about the target domain” (Nierbert, & Gropengiesser, 2015, p. 905).  
 Mappings are, however, not arbitrary. What is mapped must not conflict with the 
schematic structure of the target (see for example Hesse, 1970; Kövecses, 2010; Lakoff, & 
Johnson, 1980). When a target is structured in terms of a particular source, certain aspects of the 
target are highlighted (metaphor highlighting) while simultaneously other aspects are hidden 
(metaphor hiding) (Kövecses, 2010; Lakoff, & Johnson, 1980).  
 
Metaphor in science discourse and science education 
Richards (1936) early on noted the presence of metaphors in scientific discourse and technical 
language, even though, in theory, philosophers of science objected to metaphors in scientific 
discourse as they are not concomitant of the intended objectivity of the scientific language. But 
many scientists do use metaphors in scientific writing. They perform several crucial roles, such as 
coining new terminology (e.g. ‘wormwholes’ in general relativity and ‘electron clouds’) as well as 
theory-building (e.g. Bohr’s appearance of the atom based on the solar system) (Boyd, 1979).  
More recently, Lakoff and Nuñez (2000) proposed that scientific discourse, in particular 
Mahematics, is very much metaphorical and embodied, contrary to the well-entrenched myth that 
Mathematics is abstract and desembodied. Metaphor, in particular, plays a defining role in 
mathematical ideas, i.e. “conceptual metaphor structures mathematics as human beings 
conceptualize it” (Lakoff, & Nuñez, 2000, p. 4). For instance, numbers are conceptualized as 
wholes made up of parts. The metaphor ARITHMETIC IS OBJECT CONSTRUCTION (Lakoff, 
& Nuñez, 2000, pp. 65-66) underlies expressions such as “Five is made up of two plus three”, “You 
can factor 28 into 7 times 4”, and “If you put 2 and 2 together, you get 4”. The source domain is 
composed of the embodied concept of object and related notions (e.g. properties such as size) which 
are mapped on to a target domain composed of abstract concepts such as number, subtraction, etc. 
Conceptual metaphors have been identified in scientific discourse for other topics as well, e.g. 
quantum mechanics (Brookes, & Etkina, 2007), biochemistry (Semino, 2008). 
Conceptual metaphors, in particular analogies, i.e. novel metaphors, deliberately 
constructed to convey complex concepts, are considered to be central in explaining science in 
both formal and informal educational settings (Gilbert, & Justi, 2016; Zhai, & Dillon, 2014). 
However, most of the known benefits of analogies come from research in science classroom. 
Analogies can provide visualization of invisible and abstract entities and processes; enhance the 
understanding of abstract entities; increase students’ interest in the target; and make students’ 
ideas clear to teachers (Duit, 1991; Harrison, & Treagust, 2000). Understanding analogies 
generated by others is not an easy task (Dagher, 1995; Harrison, & De Jong, 2005), because 
learners may develop or reinforce misconceptions when they attempt to make sense of them. 
Increasing the potentialities of an analogy and decreasing its limitations requires: 1) familiarity 
with the source, enhanced when it is embodied in the addressee’s experience (Niebert, Marsch, & 
Treagust 2012); 2) discussion of the mappings between the source and the target, so that high 
order relations (often cause) can be established in constructing the target (Gentner, 2003); and 3) 
evaluation of the deductions about the target, by reflecting on its structural soundness (e.g. what 
is highlighting and hidden) and relevance (Markman, 1997).  
More recently, studies suggested that conventional metaphors can also have value in 
school science. Conventional metaphors, unlike analogies, are commonly used in everyday 
language. Amin (2009) suggests that alongside analogies, conventional metaphors can be an 
additional tool to enhance conceptual change. The main argument that supports this claim 
emerges from the analysis of the term energy in everyday discourse and in the book “The 
Feynman Lectures on Physics”. The analysis showed that the scientific discourse uses multiple 
conventional metaphors to convey different aspects of energy; that different conceptual 
metaphors are used in different contexts; and that some of the metaphors employed in scientific 
and everyday discourse overlap. Hence, moving from naïve understanding of energy to a 
scientific one may be facilitated when the conventional metaphors used in scientific discourse are 
recognized. However, while many of the image schemas that structure scientific discourse are 
familiar to the learner, they often exhibit difficulties in establishing the mapping underlying the 
conventional metaphors presented in scientific discourse (Amin, 2009). Studies that compare 
conceptual metaphors in students’ discourse with scientific textbook (e.g. on the theme glaciers 
(Felzmann, 2014) or climate change (Niebert, & Gropengiesser, 2013)) show that both discourses 
rely on similar image schemas, but students and scientists conceptualize the target differently. 
Making sense of a given target is, according to Kövecses (2010) enhanced when several 
conceptual metaphors are employed (see also the concept of integrated multiple analogies by 
Brown and Clement, 1989 and Spiro, Feltovich, Coulson, and Anderson, 1989). Hence, Niebert 
and Gropengiesser (2015) suggest that learning can be enhanced through the use of external 
representations that uncover the image-schematic structure of concepts. More recently, Daane, 
Haglund, Robertson, Close, and Scherr (2018) found that teachers use conventional metaphors to 
express ideas about energy, although they are unaware of their use. The study showed that 
engaging teachers with conventional metaphors allowed them to perceive their value in teaching 
abstract concepts and in providing insights into their students’ thinking.  
 
Methodology 
The focus of the study (i.e. how museum educators explain light to students during school visits); 
the nature of the inquiry, which generated context-dependent and empirical linguistic data (i.e. 
naturally occurring language); and the type of product expected (i.e. description and 
interpretation of a phenomenon, as a result of an interpretative approach), justify the option for a 
qualitative approach for this study (Creswell, 2008; Denzin, & Lincoln, 1994).  
 
Data collection 
Participants in this study were three paid museum educators (20-30 years old), who voluntarily 
accepted to participate in the study. Two of them hold a first degree in Chemistry, and the other 
in Biology. These museum educators often played a central role during the interaction with 
students (7th to 9th grade), controlling the interaction, the direction of talk, and offering 
explanations. Occasionally, and when students were receptive, museum educators also engaged 
in a dialogic model of communication, in which questions were generated to support students’ 
meaning-making. For students attending the 7th to 9th grade, museum educators were expected 
to start the school visit by providing an overview of the museum and of its mission. After this 
initial stage, museum educators were expected to stay in the exhibition areas, observing and 
supporting students while they were interacting with the exhibits, rather than providing a guided 
visit.  
For this study, students attending the 8th grade (13-14) were selected. They were 
identified from the list of scheduled school visits. This audience was chosen because optics is 
introduced in Portugal at this level and because these students represent one of the main 
audiences visiting the museum, being familiar to museum educators.  
The physics teachers were interviewed at the entrance of museum, enabling an 
identification of the type of visit and, in case the visits were unstructured (i.e. students did not 
receive pre-guidance for the visit by their teachers, nor was it integrated in the classroom-based 
learning unit), to collect data about the students (Appendix 1). The students were from six 
schools and their achievement in physics was heterogeneous with non-extensive knowledge in 
optics. They were not familiar with the museum.  
Data were collected at three interactive exhibits, which were part of a science museum 
exhibition about light. The selected exhibits were: ‘Internal reflection’, showing the efficacy of 
light propagation in optical fiber; ‘Light decomposed does not decompose further’, a model of 
Newton’s crucial experiment in order to show that once white light is decomposed it does not 
decompose further; and ‘Light refraction’ aimed at comparing light propagation through a lens 
immersed in media with different index of refraction. A description of the exhibits is provided in 
Table 2.  
 [INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
These exhibits were the ones selected because they were identified by museum educators as those 
which triggered conversations between them and the students. Two audio-recorders were situated 
near the exhibits in places suggested by museum educators. In addition, the third author took 
field notes as a non-participant observer. The field notes aimed at facilitating transcriptions. They 
included aspects such the participation of a teacher in the interaction between the museum 
educators and the students, the location of a teacher in relation to the group of students and to the 
museum educators, the use of electronic devices or worksheets, the use of other resources by 
museum educators to represent ideas (e.g. visual representations), and the number of students 
engaged in interaction with museum educators.   
Similarly to Allen’s (2002) study, a notice board was placed at the entrance of the 
museum in a visible location advising that audio-recordings were taking place in the museum 
near some of the exhibits in order to collect data for the study, whose aims were also stated. 
Furthermore, teachers were approached at the entrance of the museum and the aims of the study 
and procedures for data collection explained. The teachers and one of the authors of this paper 
informed the students about the study and asked for their permission. Students were not aware of 
the position of the recorders, so that the social dynamics of participants could be as spontaneous 
as possible. At the end of the visit, the position of the recorders was disclosed to students who 
authorized the use of the recordings.  
Conversations in front of the exhibits were continuously recorded during a school visit. A 
total of 158 conversations in Portuguese were transcribed and then translated into English. Of 
these 158 conversations, 20% (n=32) were chosen because they were the ones in which the 
museum educator interacted with students without the participation or observation of a teacher. In 
none of these interactions, museum educators used electronic devices, worksheets, or produced 
visual representations.  
 
Data analysis 
The analysis of 32 conversations revealed that museum educators engaged in some explanatory 
activity (as defined by Gilbert, Boulter, & Rutherford, 2000) in 28 conversations. These 28 
conversations were analyzed by focusing on the museum educators’ speech turns. Assuming that 
in a conversation the participants involved take alternative turns to speak, museum educators’ 
speech turns correspond to the speech allocated to a museum educator in a conversation. A turn 
may range from a single world (e.g. ‘certainly’) to syntactic constructions with varying degrees 
of structural complexity. Each turn ends at a “transition-relevance place” (Clark, 1996, p. 321), 
i.e. when the listeners project the end of an allocated turn from a combination of facial 
expressions, syntax, intonation and eye gaze (Clark, 1996). The speech turns for each museum 
educator were read entirely in order to determine whether explanations, as defined by Gilbert, 
Boulter and Rutherford (2000), were produced. A museum educators’ speech turn could include a 
single explanation, multiple explanations or no explanations at all. The different segments of the 
text which included explanations were analyzed in terms of content, based on the categories 
“types of explanation” defined in advance by Gilbert, Boulter and Rutherford (2000) (see Table 
1). Two authors, initially separately and then by agreement, coded the explanations included in 
each museum educators’ speech turn. As a result, we identified 75 explanations included in 104 
museum educators’ speech turns.  
The analysis of the form of the museum educators’ speech turn at the micro-level was 
carried out on the original Portuguese data (not the corresponding English translation) and 
encompassed an identification and classification of the lexicon used in the explanations (i.e. 
terminological, common or hybrid) as well as all the metaphors, including analogies, which 
emerged in museum educators’ speech turns. We took an inductive approach following Cameron 
(2007) and followed similar steps to the ones in metaphor analysis employed by Niebert and 
Gropengiesser (2015) and Pragglejaz Group (2017). In order to identify the metaphors, we 
located key words related to the scientific concepts in each exhibition, e.g. light, prism, optical 
fiber, etc., and the immediate linguistic context in which they occurred, e.g. existence of 
prepositions co-occurring with the lexical item which could shed light on image schemas (e.g. 
container, path), existence of quantifiers or other nouns (such as mirror, water, etc.) which 
entered an ‘X is Y’ identification structure. Next, we assessed whether the located lexical units 
belonged to a more concrete (i.e. bodily, sensorimotor based) or abstract domain in the specific 
context they occurred. Finally, if the “contextual meaning constrast[ed] with the basic meaning 
[of the located lexical items] but could be understood in comparison with it” (Pragglejaz Group, 
2007, p. 3), the meaning of the lexical unit was considered to be metaphorical. Once this was 
done, we identified metaphors which were relevant to build explanations about the phenomena 
and grouped those with the same target and source domain. The nature of the conceptual 
metaphor was interpreted with reference to image schemas, which ground metaphors in embodied 
cognition. The metaphors are presented in capital letters, and in the format TARGET IS 
SOURCE (Lakoff, & Johnson, 1980).  
In addition, the analysis of the language used for explaining light allowed an 
identification of model descriptors employed (both explicitly or through conceptual metaphors), 
and, consequently, on the models in which explanations of the phenomena are based. This 
procedure is justified because what can be explained as well as the quality of an explanation (i.e. 
level of explanation) are constrained by he selected model(s). The quality of explanations was 
analyzed, using as a reference the model(s) in which they are based. Two authors, initially 
separately and then by agreement, identified the models employed and coded the quality of 
explanations. 
Illustrative excerpts from the transcripts are included, and identified by two codes: one 
attributed to a museum educator (ME1, ME2, or ME3), and the other to the transcript in which 
the explanations were identified (Tr1….Tr28). 
 
Results 
In this section, we present the findings of our analysis. In the first subsection, the models used for 
explaining light are summarized. In the subsequent subsections, we present the results organized 
by function, form and level of explanations for each exhibit.  
 
The models used by museum educators for explaining light 
An overview of the data suggests that explanations of light were based on geometric optics or on 
a hybrid model. The geometric model was described by a limited number of model descriptors, 
namely: ray of light, beam of light. They were defined as having position, direction, and speed. 
The hybrid model combined the model descriptors of the geometric model and represented light 
as matter.  
The use of the geometric model was inferred from the museum educators’ discourse, as it 
employed model descriptors and their attributes, either provided explicitly (i.e. beam of light, ray 
of light ray, propagation, speed), or through the use of the conceptual metaphor LIGHT 
PROPAGATION IS TRAVELING. This metaphor enhances the creation of an image in the 
students’ mind, as the source domain is grounded on image schemas. As light is conceptualized 
as an entity that propagates in space, the source domain includes image schemas pertaining to 
partial orientation (i.e. as shown on Table 3 a source (comes, comes from in (b) and (e), an 
intended destination (arrives at, arrives in (a), (c), (d) and (e)) and a path or track (passes/ go 
through, changes direction, deviation from the path in (a), (b), (d), and (e)). In addition, speed as 
an attribute of light ray is communicated through the vocabulary slows down (see (b), Table 3), 
which complements the source-path-goal schema, in the metaphor LIGHT PROPAGATION IS 
TRAVELING. The elaboration of the schema is possible as speed can be part of the embodied 
experience of the concept of traveling which constitute the source domain. The materialization of 
light in the hybrid model was expressed through the metaphor LIGHT IS A SUBSTANCE (Table 
3). As a result, light is conceptualized as a substance which can be quantified, as the following 
examples on Table 3 show: the quantity of light (f), all go, or almost entirely (g), more light (h) 
and less light (i), and itemized2.  
The robustness of the geometric model, per se, is low as it is very difficult to approach 
optics by thinking “purely geometrically”. Hence, geometric optics is often combined with the 
wave model (for example in the context of the dependence of refractive index on wavelength). 
However, to explain a given part of a phenomenon, e.g. qualitative explanation of reflection, the 
geometrical model may be solid enough (Fredlund, Airey, & Linder, 2012; Raftopoulos, 
Kalyfommatou, & Constantinou, 2005). On the other hand, the robustness of the hybrid model is 
compromised as it is not coherent with scientific models of light. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The exhibit ‘Internal reflection’: Function, form, and level of explanations 
Data suggest that museum educators approached the exhibit ‘Internal reflection’ by focusing on 
two phenomena: ‘internal reflection’ in optical fiber, and ‘transmission loss’ in non-crystalline 
media (oil and air). In both cases, the explanations performed the functions of contextualizing the 
phenomena, describing the effects of light propagation in each medium, and explaining their 
causes.  
In museum educators’ discourse, the use of specific lexicon was necessary to give the 
phenomena a name, i.e. to provide contextualizing explanations, as (1) shows: 
 
(1) “Here, what we have are optical fiber, and in optical fiber happens a phenomenon that we 
call total reflection or integral reflection” (…) (ME3, Tr6) 
On the other hand, descriptive and causal explanations were communicated using hybrid lexicon 
(i.e. a mixture of specific lexicon and non-specific everyday language, such as greater intensity of 
light in (2)) and were structured through conceptual metaphors.  
 
 (2)  “If we take a look, there is a greater intensity of light that arrives here [optical fiber], isn’t 
there? (…)” (ME3, Tr5) 
 
Causal explanations for explaining light propagation in different media were based on geometric 
optics and, sometimes, on the hybrid model, with the support of the conceptual metaphors LIGHT 
PROPAGATION IS TRAVELING and LIGHT IS A SUBSTANCE. In addition, other conceptual 
metaphors were identified, namely: MEDIUM OF PROPAGATION IS A CONTAINER OF 
LIGHT; OPTICAL FIBER IS A CONDUIT OF LIGHT; OPTICAL FIBER IS AN 
ACCELERATOR OF LIGHT; OPTICAL FIBER IS A MIRROR; and TRANSMISSION LOSS 
IN A PIPE IS WATER-FILLED PIPE LEAKING (Table 4).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The analysis of the structure of the conceptual metaphor shows that each metaphor provides a 
different contribution to the causal explanations of light propagation in different media. Hence, in 
the metaphor MEDIUM OF PROPAGATION IS A CONTAINER OF LIGHT, the source domain 
is grounded on the embodied conceptualization of the media in which light is propagated (optical 
fiber, oil, and air) as a well-delimited entity and capable of holding something (inside of the fiber 
optic (m), in optical fiber (k), light gets out (l), passing through the optical fiber (o)). In this 
particular case, the medium is an instance of a container substance (Lakoff, & Johnson, 1980). The 
conceptualization of oil as a container is based primarily on our bodily experience. The fact that 
human bodies are metaphorically conceptualized as containers allows for artificial boundaries to 
be imposed on otherwise unbounded entities such as substances. Unlike oil, air is here not 
conceptualized as being a container, but rather as not having a physical existence at all (AIR IS 
NOTHING), as (n) shows. The source domain is based on the embodied experience of substances 
with physical properties which can be perceived with the senses and manipulated. Air, unlike 
optical fiber or oil, is invisible to the senses, hence conceptualized as not having a corporeal 
existence.  
In the conventional metaphors OPTICAL FIBER IS A CONDUIT OF LIGHT and 
OPTICAL FIBER IS AN ACCELERATOR OF LIGHT, light is assumed to travel along a conduit 
becoming more intense, as (p) illustrates. The metaphorical mapping between intensity of a process 
and speed is a conventional one: INTENSITY IS SPEED (Kovecses, 2009, p. 292). Cameron 
(2008, p. 197) pointed out that “metaphor in talk is dynamic”, i.e. metaphors occur dynamically in 
discourse as the speaker “adjusts and adapts to what the other say”.  After the student observed that 
light becomes more intense in optical fiber, the guide reinforces this observation by using the 
INTENSITY IS SPEED metaphor. At the generic level, this metaphor is usually employed in a 
relatively conventional way with reference to processes. However, the metaphor in its current use 
refers not the intensity of a process but of a substance, in line with the identified metaphor LIGHT 
IS A SUBSTANCE. 
In the analogies OPTICAL FIBER IS A MIRROR3 and TRANSMISSION LOSS IN A 
PIPE IS WATER-FILLED PIPE LEAKING, the source analogues are part of an experiential 
interaction with the observed world, i.e. experience with light in mirrors (see (q) and (r)) and water 
pipes or hoses leaking (see (s)). 
Metaphors employed by museum educators often co-occur in the same speech turn, as (3) 
and (4), examples of causal explanations for light propagation in optical fiber, illustrate. 
 
 (3)  “Here, what we have is optical fiber, and in optical fiber a phenomenon that we call total 
reflection or integral reflection takes place, in which we have the fibers functioning as 
mirrors and always reflecting light to the inside. As the light is completely reflected to 
the inside of the optical fiber, there are no deviations responsible for seeing it from here. 
Light will all go, or almost entirely, to the other side. So, the most effective way to 
conduct light is…  (ME3, Tr6) 
 (4) “Light is going through it…the optical fiber is composed by mirrors, while these are not. 
When light is incident in mirrors it is reflected. This does not happen down here. Why? 
Because this has oil and this has nothing [air]. So, they allow light to get out here. This 
is because light is more intense there. […] in optical fiber light gets faster [than in other 
media]” (ME 2, Tr8) 
 
Expressions such as light will all go, to the other side, and there are no deviations in (3) 
offer the conceptualization of light as a traveling entity, and prepositional phrases to the inside of 
the optical fiber offer the conceptualization of the medium as a container. The inside surface of 
this container is compared to mirrors that reflect light, which hold and guide light (conduct light) 
along the optical fiber until the destination through a process of multiple reflection. 
In (4), the conceptualization of light as a traveling entity (light is going through and get out), 
of the medium as a container (in optical fiber), and of the optical fiber as a mirror are again 
expressed. The conceptualization of optical fiber as being an accelerator and conduit of light (gets 
faster) is also present in (4), as well as the conceptualization of the medium air as not having a 
corporeal existence. 
The quality of the explanations (i.e. their level of explanation) is affected by the consistency 
of the selected conceptual metaphors employed with the scientific domain. For example, in (4), 
the use of the metaphor OPTICAL FIBER IS AN ACCELERATOR OF LIGHT results in an 
invalid scientific explanation. Causal explanations for transmission loss in non-crystalline media 
are another example in which the selected conceptual metaphors resulted in explanations 
incoherent with scientific knowledge (see (5) below). Transmission loss in non-crystalline media 
is often explained through the analogy TRANSMISSION LOSS IN A PIPE IS WATER-FILLED 
PIPE LEAKING (which also encompasses another analogy, namely LIGHT IS WATER). In this 
analogy, the loss of water in the source domain is mapped on to the transmission of light in the 
target domain, hence light is conceptualized as water. This is problematic, because no other 
elements in the source domain with reference to water can be efficiently mapped on to the target 
domain of light, as scattering and refraction have no structural similarity with a leaking water 
pipe.  
 
 (5)  “(…) if we see light like this, from here [side of the pipe], light will not reach there, of    
course. Imagine that these are hoses with water. If water comes out here, it will not reach 
there.” (ME3, Tr3) 
 
There are some explanations for light propagation in optical fiber which are acceptable within 
geometric optics (e.g. (3)). This is because the explanations provided are structured through 
multiple conceptual metaphors (ranging from conduit to mirror metaphors) that maintain higher-
order relations between the sources and targets. These explanations, qualitative in nature, are less 
abstract, precise and complex than those produced by geometric optics. In terms of precision, the 
low detail in representing aspect of internal reflection emerges from the use of hybrid lexicon, 
and from the lack of explicit reference to disciplinary parameters (e.g. direction of light inside the 
optical fiber). The use of hybrid lexicon is a source of imprecision reducing the consistency of the 
explanation, and hence its complexity. Finally, abstraction is low not only because explanations 
are qualitative and described with few parameters, but also because the use of the analogy 
provides a visualization of the structure of internal reflection.  
 
The exhibit ‘Light decomposed does not decompose further’: Function, form and level of 
explanations 
In the exhibit ‘Light decomposed does not decompose further’, the explanations were of the 
descriptive type and comprised two parts: one focusing on the visible spectrum of light produced, 
and the other focusing on the fact that each monochromatic light is not decomposed at the second 
prism. These explanations were communicated mainly through the use of hybrid lexicon. Specific 
lexicon was used less frequently in each explanation (i.e. monochromatic light (y), incident beam 
(y), beam of light (y), white light (w)) (see Table 5). 
  These explanations were structured by a combination of two or more conceptual 
metaphors: THE VISIBLE SPECTRUM OF LIGHT IS THE RAINBOW, VISIBLE LIGHT 
SPECTRUM IS COLORED BANDS, LIGHT IS COLOR, PRISM IS A SPREADER OF 
COLORS, PRISM IS A WHITE-COLOR-BREAKER, LIGHT IS A SUBSTANCE (Table 5).  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Each metaphor structures different aspects of the Newton’s crucial experiment, selecting 
particular angles from which the phenomena underlying the exhibit can be explained, but at times 
missing relevant aspects. Hence, the conventional metaphors THE VISIBLE SPECTRUM OF 
LIGHT IS THE RAINBOW, THE VISIBLE LIGHT SPECTRUM IS COLORED BANDS, 
LIGHT IS COLOR result from the identification of the observations with the familiar embodied 
experience of the rainbow and of color, which is inherent in things (Lakoff, & Johnson, 1980). 
THE VISIBLE SPECTRUM OF LIGHT IS THE RAINBOW and THE VISIBLE LIGHT 
SPECTRUM IS COLORED BANDS are sometimes complemented by referring to the seven 
colors (see (u) - (y)), which seems to perpetuate Newton’s analogy THE VISIBLE LIGHT 
SPECTRUM IS MUSICAL CHORDS.  
With regard to LIGHT IS COLOR, color is conceptualized as a property of light, white 
light is a blending of colors, and each color a kind of light, as (v) and (w) show. The role of the 
prism in light dispersion is provided through the metaphors PRISM IS A SPREADER OF 
COLORS and PRISM IS A WHITE-COLOR-BREAKER. The former metaphor reflects the 
observable angular divergence of rays that emerge from the prism. The latter expressed through 
the terms decompose and divide does not emerge from direct observation, as the color production 
is not attributed to the prism but seen as existing in light (see (y)). The embodied source domain 
in these metaphors is based on very basic experience of spatial orientation, such as up and down, 
center and periphery, etc.  
In the explanations, the metaphor LIGHT IS A SUBSTANCE is also present. As a 
substance, light hits a prism (see (j) Table 3) and as a result is itemized into parts, in this case, 
into different colors (see (j) and (k) (Table 3). The source domain of this metaphor is grounded 
on the experience of countable and uncountable substances and on the cultural experience of light 
as a commodity (in industrialized societies, at least) in which light is divided into units, which are 
recorded in a meter2, that we use and pay for.  
 The descriptive explanations that emerge through the use of these conceptual metaphors 
neglect important aspects of Newton’s crucial experiment (e.g. monochromatic light is only 
deviated in the second prism), and introduce some misrepresentations (e.g. visible spectrum of 
light is discontinuous).  
 
The exhibit ‘Light refraction’: function, form and level of explanations 
In the exhibit ‘Light refraction’, the explanations were mainly provided for the lens immersed in 
water, being the vessel with glycerin often neglected (see (6)). Some everyday vocabulary (e.g. 
amplified) is used to describe the observed changes of the image of the stripes (i.e. displacement 
of the stripes), when the lens is immersed in one and in the other medium (see (7)). However, 
most of the time the nature of the changes is omitted in the descriptions (we see the stripes this 
way (6); they [the stripes] are seen different [in air and water]). Specific vocabulary, namely 
reflection, is sometimes employed (see (6)), and supports the audience to identify the source of 
light propagation in the selected system.  
As the examples (6) and (7) illustrate, causal explanations for the phenomenon is built 
through the use of the metaphor LIGHT PROPAGATION IS TRAVELING, and by employing 
scientific terms (e.g. reflected, refraction in (6)) and INTENSITY IS SPEED (e.g. slows down in 
(7)). Indeed, reflected and refraction were the only specific lexical items employed when 
explanations were generated.  
 (6)  “In this specific situation, we see the stripes this way because there is light that is 
reflected on the stripes. Whenever this light appears in a different medium, it is refracted, 
i.e. it changes direction (…). When we observe the stripes we are bringing to our eyes 
light that passes through different media. Hence, it has a different refraction and the 
direction in which it arrives at our eyes is different.” (ME3, Tr28) 
(7)  “When you take them [the lenses] out, you see the lenses. What happens when you 
immerse the lenses in the liquids and look at the stripes? On this side [water vessel] they 
are amplified, and there [glycerin vessel] they are not amplified. So, what happened? Here 
(in water), light that comes from the back (air) slows down in the water and changes its 
direction.” (ME3, Tr25) 
 
The metaphor provides a qualitative explanation for light refraction, as it includes relevant 
parameters, namely speed of light, optical path, media and direction (Fredlund, Airey, & Linder, 
2012). While this qualitative description of Snell’s law provides the base for describing and 
comparing the path of light rays through the lens when it is immersed in media with different 
index refraction, this was not included in museum educators’ explanations. Hence, while the 
conventional metaphor is relevant in structuring the causal explanation, it is per se, insufficient to 
accurately explain what happened in the system. For that, other model descriptors are required, 
such the indexes of refraction of the media and the relation between them. As a result, precision 
and complexity of the explanations are, therefore, low.  
 
Discussion 
In the results section, we showed that in all types of explanations produced (descriptive, causal), 
conceptual metaphors (both conventional and analogical) as well as hybrid lexicon were used. 
Some conventional metaphors (LIGHT PROPAGATION IS TRAVELING and LIGHT IS 
SUBSTANCE) were pervasive, recurring in museum educators’ speech turns in all exhibits, 
whereas others were specific to certain exhibits (MEDIUM OF PROPAGATION IS A 
CONTAINER). Often, an explanation (descriptive or causal) was structured through the use of 
multiple conceptual metaphors, each highlighting different aspects of the target and hiding others. 
Explanations were qualitative in nature and their quality was, in part, constrained by the type of 
inferences allowed by the conceptual metaphor. Those consistent with the scientific target 
domain were less precise, less abstract and less complex than those based on geometric optics. 
The characteristics of the museum educators’ explanations (function, form, and level) are 
discussed in turn. 
 
Function of explanations 
Descriptive and causal explanations were, not surprisingly, the most prevalent type of 
explanations. This may reflect an awareness of these professionals of the teachers’ main reason 
for implementing school visits (i.e. expecting students to learn content (Kisiel, 2005) and a will to 
contribute to it). Not only the audience but also the type of exhibits might have constrained the 
type of explanations generated. Indeed, the exhibits under analysis focus on fundamental optics, 
rather than on processes or on twenty-first-century wicked problems (Dillon et al., 2016), which 
are more likely to generate other types of explanations. It is important to note that only 
descriptive explanations were generated in the exhibit ‘Light decomposed does not decompose 
further’. The fact that the exhibit represents Newton’s crucial experiment might have restricted 
the explanations to the context of its creation, i.e. to Newton’s study of properties of white light. 
However, because the experiment did not provide evidence of the attributes of white light 
(Martins, & Silva, 2001) and because several historical models coexisted in the interpretation of 
the observations, this exhibit was a missed opportunity to discuss the processes of science 
(Rutherford, 2000).  
Intentional and predictive explanations were not valued by museum educators. Intentional 
explanations are important, as they provide reasons for engaging with the science underlying an 
exhibit. Hence, they contribute to provide a clear vision of the purpose of the communication, 
which, in turn, will have a positive impact on learning (Gilbert, 2013). They can also provide an 
opportunity for creating links between the exhibits, the exhibition, and the mission of the 
museum. Intentional explanations can also contribute to trigger an emotional response towards 
the exhibits, which may lead to an engagement with them. Predictive explanations, on the other 
hand, are likely to support inquiry-based discussions, which may lead to visitors’ emotional 
involvement with the exhibits, as visitors develop learning and build their own narratives 
(Gutwill, & Allen, 2010; Reiss, & Tunnicliffe, 2011). 
The generation of predictive explanations, however, seems to be constrained by the 
design of the exhibits. For example, the degree of freedom for what can be observed is high for 
the exhibit ‘Light decomposed does not decompose further’, but low for the other two exhibits.  
 
Form of explanations 
The use of everyday language, rather than language from the specific domain of optics, is 
inescapable when science is communicated to an audience with a non-extensive knowledge in 
science (Laszlo, 2006). The same could be said for the use of conventional metaphors.   
The efficacy of these metaphors in communicating science results from the fact that many image 
schemas (e.g. container and conduit image schemas) that structure scientific discourse are 
familiar to learners, because they are embodied (Amin, 2009). However, when museum educators 
use certain metaphors without the nature of light being explicitly mentioned, the metaphors, 
deeply embodied in their experiences, could be literally understood. For example, in the 
metaphor MEDIUM OF PROPAGATION IS A CONTAINER (of light), the implicit 
conceptualization of light as a substance (which is contained) is present. This is further reinforced 
by the use of LIGHT IS A SUBSTANCE. Embodiment is important to explain science but it is 
also important that the source domain grounded on embodied conceptualizations is mapped on to 
valid scientific conceptualizations, an operation that is not a simple matter for students 
(Felzmann, 2014, Niebert, & Gropengiesser, 2013). 
In other conventional metaphors, e.g. in LIGHT IS COLOR, the source and target 
domains are not successfully mapped.  Color is, in the scientific domain, defined as “a 
manifestation of the electrochemical sensing system, eye, nerved, brain” (Hecht, 2002, p. 78). 
This explanation would not be appropriate to engage many science museum visitors, but other 
accurate conceptualizations are available, e.g. “light that is seen with a certain colour” (Hecht, 
2002, p.78). However, this level of accuracy of expression requires an awareness of the language 
used, which, in the case of conceptual metaphors, might be difficult or even unrealistic (Jeppsson, 
Haglund, Amin, & Strömdahl, 2013). Developing science teachers’ ability to recognize 
conventional metaphors cannot be achieved with short interventions, according to Daane et al. 
(2018). Teachers also pointed out that “to attend to metaphorical language is almost to learn a 
new language, […] a new kind of listening” (p. 17).   
Grounding scientific explanations on embodied experiences has a very important 
function, namely to engage museum visitors with the phenomena being shown by connecting 
them with the visitors’experiences (Niebert, Marsch, &Treagust, 2012). The scientific validity of 
such explanations is not always preserved when explanations are solely based on embodied 
experiences; they must necessarily make use of other resources. Hence, inappropriate analogies 
such as TRANSMISSION LOSS IN A PIPE IS WATER-FILLED PIPE LEAKING may 
constitute a source of students’ misconceptions about transmission loss in light guide. It is also 
the case, nevertheless, that good analogies (i.e. analogies with higher-order relations within and 
between souce and target) may not necessarily lead to learning (Dagher, 1995; Niebert, Marsch, 
&Treagust, 2012). For example, the success in understanding the analogy OPTICAL FIBER IS A 
MIRROR is constrained by students’ familiarity with the source analogue, namely the behavior 
of light in mirrors, and by the operationalization of the analogy. For those not familiar with the 
source analogue, the explanation may not be completely understood because museum educators 
rarely ensured that the source analogue is embodied in the addressee’s experiences; while 
reflection is familiar to students’ embodied experiences (e.g. Tiberghien, Delacote, Ghiglione, & 
Metalon, 1980), multiple reflections may not be as familiar. Indeed, students have difficulties in 
conceptualizing light in geometric optics, i.e. as an entity consisting of rays that propagate in 
straight lines (Raftopoulos, Kalyfommatou, & Constantinou, 2005). Furthermore, the absence of 
an explicit mapping between the source and target analogue does not allow an assessment on how 
well it describes the behavior of light, e.g. it is unknown whether the mirror is mapped to the 
cladding of the optical fiber.   
 Multiple conceptual metaphors are often employed to structure an explanation, by 
highlighting different aspects of the scientific target, in a coherent way (i.e. in the sense that 
correspondences in different metaphors overlap, providing a sense that they “fit together” 
(Lakoff, & Johnson, 1980, p. 94). For example, the container and conduit metaphor hold similar 
correspondences, being the latter metaphor more specific than the former. Amin (2009) also 
identified multiple coherent metaphors for structuring the concept of energy. As Jeppsson et al. 
(2013) suggested, these multiple metaphors, that “fit together”, provide an experiential narrative, 
which constitutes an important aspect for science communication. Indeed, some authors (see 
Ogborn, Kress, Martins, & McGillicuddy, 1996; Turney, 2004) argue that explanations similar to 
stories (e.g. in which there are protagonists (entities) responsible for events) support students 
understanding (Ogborn, Kress, Martins, & McGillicuddy, 1996) and the communication of 
science to lay audience (Turney, 2004).  
 
Level of explanation 
The quality of explanation (in terms of precision, abstractness and complexity) can be seen using 
the museum educators’ selected model as a reference. The use of a hybrid model, in which light 
is conceptualized, generated explanations incoherent with the scientific target domain. As a 
result, misconceptions may be induced or reinforced. Misrepresentations of scientific ideas are 
problematic, not only because they mask the understanding of optical phenomena but also 
because they negatively interfere with the flow of students’ developing understanding (Gilbert, 
Boulter, & Rutherford, 2000). Consequently, students will need an additional effort to 
recommence learning, leading to a decrease in motivation (Gilbert, Boulter, & Rutherford, 2000).  
Other explanations were based on geometric optics. This is an adequate model for 
framing the explanations, due to the type of phenomenon underlying the exhibits (Hecht, 2002) 
and the audience’s knowledge in optics. In addition, it does not require learners to hold complex 
models of light, giving to a lay audience the opportunity to engage with basic features and 
regularities of optical phenomena (Raftopoulos, Kalyfommatou, & Constantinou, 2005).  
The quality of museum educators’ explanations is low, using as a reference geometric 
optics. These explanations use a restricted number of model descriptors in their explanation, 
which are often translated to the audience through the use of metaphors and imprecise everyday 
vocabulary. The structure of explanations (i.e. through multiple conceptual metaphors) leads to 
explanations that are qualitative in nature. Consequently, their level of abstraction is reduced 
when compared to those generated in science. In the latter context, formal codes of representation 
are employed.  
Finally, regarding complexity, while these explanations are coherent, many of them are 
incomplete, e.g. those provided in the exhibit ‘Light refraction’, which sometimes were 
dissociated from the observations. More complex explanations may be difficult to communicate, 
particularly when language is the main means of communication. The communication of these 
explanations about light requires a flexible use of multimodal representations (Kuo, Won, 
Zadnik, Siddiqui, & Treagust, 2017).  
 
Implications for science communication and learning 
From the findings of this small scale study emerge some implications for science communication 
and for science education of school-age children. Museum educators often communicate 
scientific content (i.e. describing and explaining phenomena) to students. Although this 
communication is important, museums have more to offer than just extending or complementing 
school content; they can support the intrinsic desire to learn in a free choice environment (Bell et 
al, 2009; Falk, & Dierking, 2000). Hence, what is communicated needs to widen to include other 
statements of knowledge, including intentional and predictive explanations. 
 The detailed analysis of the language employed by museum educators using a Cognitive 
Linguistic theoretical framework suggests that the conventional metaphors need to be brought to 
light, so that museum educators become aware of how they are used in their explanatory practice; 
reflect on their potentialities and limitations in explaining science to school students; and 
transform the language used to explain science. In addition, although good analogies are used to 
explain scientific ideas, museum educators need to use as a reference the good practices of 
teaching with analogies in school science contexts (e.g. Harrison, & Treagust, 1993) so that they 
can lead to the learning intent. Finally, museum educators need to ensure that the quality of the 
explanations is appropriate to the audience. This can be successfully achieved if museum 
educators are aware of the models they employ to base their explanations, identify the necessary 
model descriptors needed for a given explanation, analyze to what extent students (and other 
visitors) are familiar with them, and, if necessary and possible, translate them into an 
understandable language.  
Another crucial element in enhancing learning science is the use of visual representations. 
Visual representations have the ability to put in evidence the image schemas that structure the 
explanations (Niebert, & Gropengiesser, 2015). However, visual representations are not widely 
used by museum educators who rely primarily on verbal language to produce explanations, 
restricting, to some extent, what can be learned. One way forward is to pay attention to the use of 
gestures or body actions in conversation to produce meaning (vom Lehn, 2006). These non-
verbal elements can enhance science communication by calling attention to an exhibition 
element; draw a physical analogy; or indicate patterns (Gilbert, 2013). In the specific case of 
student visitors, the learning that took place in the museum could be followed up after the visit by 
the teacher, who would need to pay attention to the conceptual metaphors employed by students 
to reflect on what they learned in the museum and introduce the formal language of science. 
 
Conclusion 
This study focused on the importance of analyzing language of science communicators in 
informal contexts, in particular in a science museum. The analysis of the museum educators’ 
language at the lexical level using Cognitive Linguistics and Conceptual Metaphor Theory as the 
theoretical framework proved to be a very important avenue for further investigation, as it 
showed how language structured the explanations in a very significant way. Taking into 
consideration Yeo and Gilbert’s (2014) multidimensional framework, the study has shown how 
language conditioned the precision, complexity and abstraction of explanations. 
The explanations about light phenomena by museum educators to 8th grade students were 
mainly descriptive and causal, due to the characteristics of the audience and to the exhibit which 
focused on fundamental optics. These explanations were verbalized using particular linguistic 
resources, such as hybrid lexicon and metaphors – both conventional and novel metaphors (or 
analogies). While some of the metaphors used were in line with the scientific knowledge (e.g. 
LIGHT PROPAGATION IS TRAVELING), others were at odds with scientific knowledge (e.g. 
LIGHT S A SUBSTANCE). Furthermore, it was observed that the target concept was explained 
using several different metaphors which highlighted particular aspects of the phenomena. The 
level and precision of the explanations varied according to the metaphors which underlay the 
model used as reference to explain the phenomenon. The use of a hybrid model generated 
explanations which displayed lower levels of precision, complexity and abstraction, reinforcing, 
on the other hand, misconceptions about light phenomena. 
The results of this study show that enhancing learning of science in museums is largely 
dependent on the type of language used in the explanations, given that verbal language is 
museum educators’ primary, if not exclusive, tool to explain science. As such, museum 
educators, and science communicators more generally, must become aware not only of the 
language used but also of the models that structure the explanations.  
The research on the way that scientific phenomena in informal contexts is verbalized 
needs to continue, expanding the research to a larger sample, which could comprise an audience 
other than school students. This would allow to assess how the characteristics of the audience 
may play a role in the choice of the type of explanations and on the choice of language. 
Furthermore, although the present study only focused on the lexical strategies and metaphors 
used by the museum educators, researching language in interaction should also encompass the 
analysis of the language (as well as gestures) used by the other participants. This would allow a 
better understanding of how metaphors flow in discourse.  
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Endnotes 
1 These studies focus on English. The question arises as to whether these characteristics are 
observed in scientific texts and explanations written in other languages. See, for example, 
Halliday (1993) for a discussion on the similarities and differences between scientific writing in 
English and Chinese. 
2 In Portuguese the word is contador, literally a counter (a machine that counts). 
3 In some other explanations, the optical fiber is alternatively conceptualized as being composed 
by mirrors, as (i) illustrates. This misrepresentation of the optical fiber reduces the quality of the 
explanation.  
(i) “The optical fiber is composed by mirrors, while these are not. When light is incident   





Table 1 - Types of explanations and their characterization (Gilbert, Boulter, & Rutherford, 2000) 
Type  Characterization 
Contextualizing  
 
Answers the question: “What exactly is being investigated?”, by giving a 
name, an identity to the phenomenon, allowing it to be treated linguistically 
as a noun. 
Intentional  
 
Answers the question: “Why should a particular phenomenon be 
investigated?”. It gives some ideas of the importance of the phenomenon 
addressed. It includes, e.g. statements about the historical and/or 
contemporary value of the phenomenon; or its relevance to everyday life. 
Descriptive Answers the question: “What are the properties of a phenomenon?” by 
providing a description of its properties. It focuses on the 
concrete/observable entities of the phenomenon rather than on its abstract 
entities. 
Interpretative Answers the question: “What models can be used to think about the 
phenomenon?”, by invoking models and their descriptors that can be used 
to think about the properties of the phenomenon. 
Causal Answers the question: “Why does the phenomenon behave as it does?”, by 
stating how a model accounts for the phenomenon through “causal-and-
effect” mechanism.  
Predictive It is a subset of descriptive explanation, which aims at convincing others of 
the degree of validity of the models used for explaining a phenomenon or 
ability to produce predictions. It answers the question “How will the 
phenomenon behave (or might behave) under other, specified, 
circumstances?”. 
Table 2 – Description of the selected exhibits  
Description 
Internal reflection – The exhibit aims at showing how light is transmitted in three different 
media (air, oil, and optical fiber). The exhibit is composed by three light sources, each one 
connected to a different pipe. The pipes terminate in a front panel. The pipes, composed by the 
same material, are vertically aligned. Inside each pipe is a different medium. In the lower pipe 
the medium is air; in the middle pipe the medium is oil; and in the top pipe the medium is 
optical fiber. The pipes are transparent, allowing the media to be seen. When each light source 
is switched on, it is possible to observe the intensity of light that emerges from that pipe in the 
front panel. The intensity of light that emerges from the pipes can be compared by switching on 
more than one light source at a given time.  
Light decomposed does not decompose further – This exhibit is allusive to Newton’s optical 
crucial experiment. The exhibit is composed by a source of white light, which illuminates a 
prism. The light that emerges from the prism is projected onto a screen, where a spectrum of 
visible light can be perceived. The screen has a slit, which can be moved vertically by means of 
a lever, so that a small part of the spectrum (perceived as a band of a single color) proceeds to a 
second prism. The emergent beam of the secondary prism is projected onto a target and the 
emergent beam is perceived as having the same color as the incident beam.  
Light refraction – Inside a transparent box, there is a system composed by a front panel with 
vertical black and white stripes; two converging biconcave lenses with the same characteristics; 
and two vessels, each containing a different liquid (water and glycerin). The lenses are placed in 
front of the striped panel and are connected by a wire to a horizontal metallic bar, in such a way 
that they are horizontally aligned. At the bottom of the panel there are two transparent vessels 
(one with water, the other with glycerin). By activating a lever, the horizontal bar moves 
vertically, so that each lens can be immersed in each of the liquids contained by vessels. Hence, 
the striped panel can be seen through the lenses when they are in air, and when they are inside 
each liquid. The index of refraction of the glycerin is similar to the index of refraction of the 
medium of the lenses. Consequently, when a lens is immersed in the glycerin, an observer can 
only see a very minor displacement of the stripes of the front panel, when s/he is at right angles 
to the lens, and looking through it. In the same position, but looking through a lens immersed in 
water, the stripes are perceived as being evidently displaced to the side. 
 
Table 3 - Metaphors underlying the models employed for explaining light  








(a) (…) to make it [light] arrive in a proper time, we have to 
ensure that in that time interval, the quantity of light must be 
much greater. (ME3, Tr5) 
(b) When we have light propagating in the air or oil, what 
happens is that there is deviation in the path of light (…) 
Light will all go, or almost entirely, to the other side. So, the 






(c) In brief, white light comes, all colors arrive there 
[prism] and spread out. Then, when they go through the 
second prism, for example red, of course they will not 






(d) In this specific situation, we see the stripes this way 
because there is light that is reflected on the stripes. Whenever 
this light appears in a different medium, it is refracted, i.e. it 
changes direction (…). When we observe the stripes we are 
bringing to our eyes light that passes through different 
media, hence it has a different refraction and the direction in 
which it arrives at our eyes is different. (ME3, Tr28) 
(e) Here (in water), light that comes from the back (from 
air) slows down in the water and changes its direction. 
(ME3, Tr26) 
Table 3 - Metaphors underlying the models employed for explaining light (continuation) 
Metaphors  Exhibit  Examples 





(f) (…) to make it [light] arrive in a proper time, we have to 
ensure that in that time interval, the quantity of light must be 
much greater. (ME3, Tr5) 
(g) The light that we see leaving here, these pieces of light, if 
we call them like that, are pieces that will not reach that side 
anymore (…) Light will all go, or almost entirely, to the 
other side. So, the most effective way to conduct light is… 
(ME3, Tr6) 
(h) In other materials, light gets out from the pipe. In the 
optical fiber, more light arrives here, doesn’t it? (ME1, Tr9) 
(i) By observation, light that arrives here is more intense, isn’t 







(j) White light hits that prim and decomposes in the colors of 
the rainbow! (ME1, Tr24) 
(k) If you look here on this side, (…) all the little colors are 
there. He  [Newton] wanted to make each little piece of light, 
of color, pass through the hole in order to see whether it 
would decompose again, but, no, that didn’t happen (ME1, 
Tr22) 
Note: The expressions in bold show which parts of the museum educators’ speech turn have led 
to the identification of the conceptual metaphor. 
  
Table 4 - Metaphors used by museum educators in the exhibit ‘Internal reflection’ only 
Metaphor Examples 
MEDIUM OF 
PROPAGATION IS A 
CONTAINER OF  
LIGHT 
 
AIR IS NOTHIING 
(l) In other materials, light gets out from the pipe. In optical 
fiber, more light arrives here (ME1, Tr9) 
(m) As the light is completely reflected to the inside of the fiber 
optic, there are no deviations responsible for seeing it from here. 
(ME3, Tr6) 
(n) this does not happen down here. Why? Because this has oil 
and this has nothing [air]. (ME2, Tr8) 
OPTICAL FIBER IS A 
CONDUIT OF LIGHT 
(o) When passing through the optical fiber, [light] suffers 
internal reflection (ME3, Tr1) 




INTENSITY IS SPEED 
 
(p) Student – So, light becomes more intense in optical fiber 
Museum Educator – Exactly, in optical fiber light gets faster 
[than in other media] (ME2, Tr8) 
Note: The expressions in bold show which parts of the museum educators’ speech turn have led 




Table 4 - Metaphors used by museum educators in the exhibit ‘Internal reflection’ only 
(continuation) 
Metaphor Examples 
OPTICAL FIBER IS A 
MIRROR 
 
(q) Inside, the optical fiber is composed by mirrors. This is 
optical fiber. (ME2, Tr10) 
(r) The optical fiber is composed by mirrors, while these are 
not. When light is incident in mirrors it is reflected. (ME2, Tr8) 
TRANSMISSION LOSS 
IN A PIPE IS WATER-
FILLED PIPE LEAKING 
 
LIGHT IS WATER 
 
(s) (…) if we see light like this, from here [side of the pipe], light 
will not reach there, of course. Imagine that these are hoses 
with water. If water comes out here, it will not reach there. 
(ME3, Tr3) 
Note: The expressions in bold show which parts of the museum educators’ speech turn have led 
to the identification of the conceptual metaphor 
  
Table 5 – Metaphors used by museum educators in the exhibit ‘Light decomposed does not 
decompose further’ only 
Metaphor Examples 
THE VISIBLE SPECTRUM OF 
LIGHT IS THE RAINBOW 
(t) Look! Look at the rainbow there (ME3, Tr21) 
 
THE VISIBLE LIGHT 
SPECTRUM IS COLORED 
BANDS 
(u) There is a decomposition of light in the seven colors 
of the rainbow (ME3, Tr20) 
LIGHT IS COLOR (v) Although light goes through that prism, nothing else is 
decomposed because it is only light of one color” (ME2, 
Tr23) 
(w) In brief, white light comes, all colors arrive there 
[prism] and spread out. (ME2, Tr23) 
A PRISM IS A SPREADER OF 
COLORS 
(x) In brief, white light comes, all colors arrive there 
[prism] and spread out. (ME2, Tr23) 
A PRISM IS A WHITE-
COLOUR BREAKER 
(y) Here we have an incident beam of light in a prism, 
there is decomposition of light in the seven colors of the 
rainbow. Then, it (light) comes here, we try to divide the 
beam of light again in this prism but it does not 
decompose further…so we have monochromatic light. 
(ME3, Tr20) 
Note: The expressions in bold show which parts of the educators’ speech turn have led to the 





Questions used during the interviews to teachers 
 
- What is the grade level of the students? 
- What is the nationality of the students?  
- Overall, what is the students’ level of achievement in physics? 
- How familiar are the students with the museum? 
- What were the aims for the school visit? 
- Is the visit integrated in the content you are teaching at the moment? If so, how? 
- How familiar are students with optics? 
- How was the visit prepared in the classroom? 
- Do students bring any activity to engage in the museum? If so, which one? 
- Did you plan any activity to be developed by students after the visit? 
- Is there anything else that I did not ask and that you would like to say? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
